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Abstract—A tax authority wants to take actions it knows will foster
the greatest degree of voluntary taxpayer compliance to reduce the
“tax gap.” This paper suggests that even if a tax authority could attain
a state of complete knowledge, there are constraints on whether and
to what extent such actions would result in reducing the macro-level
tax gap. These limits are not merely a consequence of ﬁnite agency
resources. They are inherent in the system itself. To show that this is
one possible interpretation of the tax gap data, the paper formulates
known results in a different way by analyzing tax compliance as a
population with a single covariate. This leads to a standard use of the
logistic map to analyze the dynamics of non-compliance growth or
decay over a sequence of periods. This formulation gives the same
results as the tax gap studies performed over the past ﬁfty years
in the U.S. given the published margins of error. Limitations and
recommendations for future work are discussed, along with some
implications for tax policy.
Keywords—Tax law, tax compliance, tax gap, income tax.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE stoic philosopher Epictetus wrote that human suf-fering stems from our confusion over the things we can
control and the things we cannot [1]. To date, tax authorities
have viewed the landscape of the things they can control
related to what is known as “voluntary tax compliance” as
all-inclusive [2]. The only question has been, “How do tax
authorities better control this landscape?” At no time have
tax authorities asked the more restrictive (and introspective)
question, “Are there limits to a tax authority’s control over
voluntary compliance?” In asking this question, this paper does
not consider the limitations imposed by constrained resources.
It argues that the limits to a tax authority’s control over
voluntary compliance is, instead, inherent in the voluntary tax
compliance system itself.
The U.S. tax authority, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS),
has commissioned studies going back half a century to es-
timate what has become known as the “tax gap,” which
is the difference between taxes legally due the government
for a speciﬁc period and those voluntarily and timely paid
[3]. The methodological formulation in U.S. tax gap studies
has produced estimates of the voluntary compliance rate
and its complement, the non-compliance rate. Although the
tax gap estimation method changed considerably in 2001
and is constantly being reﬁned, the methodology behind its
formulation has remained fundamentally unchanged. In short,
the formulation attempts to estimate the tax gap by taking a
sample of tax returns and, when necessary, auditing them [4].
This has produced estimates of compliance rates with a ±2
percent margin of error [3]. If one takes this margin of error
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into account, the total U.S. non-compliance rate has remained
statistically unchanged since the ﬁrst tax gap study [5]. This
suggests that the tax gap estimation methods used prior to and
since 2001 are equivalent.
Over the past two decades, the tax gap has gone from a mere
statistic to a major political focus of congressional demands
made on the IRS [6]. This focus has led to a redeployment
of IRS resources to raise additional tax revenues through in-
creased domestic enforcement and to lobby for legislation such
as the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), which
gives the IRS unprecedented access to the non-U.S. activities
of taxpayers [7]- [9]. In 2018, the IRS announced a strategic
initiative to inform its administrative operations by examining
drivers of tax compliance from behavioral economics [10].
Each of these actions were taken in whole or in part as a
response to increased political pressure to reduce the tax gap.
Thus, the strategic focus of the IRS has been to decrease the
overall tax gap and the non-compliance rate.
Merely knowing the size of the overall tax gap does little
else but alert tax policymakers to the issue of non-compliance.
To address the tax gap itself, or to determine if it even
can be addressed, one must dig deeper to understand the
dynamics behind the numbers [3]. Others have attempted this
in various ways. Allingham and Sandmo famously imposed an
“economics-of-crime” model to describe a taxpayer’s choice
whether to voluntarily comply with the tax laws as an expected
utility function [11]. Some have criticized this deterrence
theory holding that, if it is correct, a tax compliance puzzle
exists since the tax gap should be signiﬁcantly greater than it
actually is [12].
Others disagree, arguing that third-party information match-
ing provides increased incentives for certain subgroups of
taxpayers, such as wage earners, to voluntarily comply [13],
[14]. Other subgroups who know that the IRS does not receive
third-party information, such as self-employed individuals,
are less likely to voluntarily comply since there is a lower
probability of non-compliance detection [15]. Disaggregated
(micro-level) tax gap data support this observation, showing
that groups for which third-party information reporting exists
exhibit signiﬁcantly higher levels of voluntary compliance than
groups for which there is little to no information reporting
[16]. This reinforces an assumption that the government has
the ability to control voluntary compliance levels if its efforts
are properly focused on encouraging structural systems that
foster compliance [17].
Yet, a tax compliance puzzle remains, just a different
kind. There exists an assumption of scalable linearity in
the argument that the right kinds of third-party reporting
(e.g., brokers reporting the basis in taxpayer investments)
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will have a signiﬁcant impact on the tax gap [18]. Historical
data, however, do not support this assumption. For example,
aggregate (macro-level) voluntary compliance rates appear
unaffected by government increases in the matching of third-
party information or any other increases in the probability of
non-compliance detection for the past half century.
Until 1974, matching programs that check tax returns
against third-party information did not exist [19]. Since 1974,
the government’s ability to match third-party information has
signiﬁcantly improved, due in part to structural systems such
as enabling legislation [20]. Still, macro-level compliance rates
remain statistically identical to what they were prior to the
start of third-party information matching programs. Some data
even suggest compliance remained unchanged for the decade
between 1963 and 1973 [19]. If matching produces a higher
probability of detection and taxpayers act in response to this
probability increase, one would expect the non-compliance
rate for years prior to 1974 to be signiﬁcantly higher than for
years after the matching program’s initiation and later matura-
tion. The fact that the non-compliance rate is statistically the
same for years prior to the matching program as it is for all
subsequent years suggests that there exist other determinants
of macro-level compliance measures.
These results are consistent with agent-based models
(ABMs) of tax compliance, which show that higher proba-
bilities of detection do affect individual taxpayers’ compli-
ance decisions, but signiﬁcant changes in the probability of
detection do not affect macro-level compliance [5]. Micro-
level compliance appears directly affected by statutory and ad-
ministrative structural systems such as information matching,
but the macro-level voluntary compliance rate has remained
statistically unchanged since the government’s initial studies.
If statutory and other structural systems positively inﬂuence
voluntary compliance at micro-levels, why don’t these same
structural systems also improve the macro-level tax gap? In
this way, deterrence theory might not be complete even if it is
correct. This is an important distinction because the macro-
level tax gap measure is the one congressional authorities
are pressuring the IRS to improve. In other words, this is
the measure that seems to politically matter the most. Yet,
attempting to solve the macro-level problem with a micro-
level solution is proving futile. Therefore, inquiring as to
the limits of the tax authority’s ability to control macro-level
compliance rates seems like a logical ﬁrst step in discussing
any government effort related to reducing the tax gap.
This paper describes what is essentially a second formula-
tion of compliance rates published in U.S. tax gap studies. The
formulation is statistically equivalent to the usual formulation.
Therefore, there are no fundamentally new results in these
compliance rate measures. Still, there is value in recognizing
old things from a new point of view [21]. Additionally, there is
always the hope that the new point of view will inspire an idea
for the modiﬁcation of present theories on tax non-compliance
generally; a modiﬁcation necessary to better align theory with
observed compliance phenomena.
For those wondering why one would introduce a mathemat-
ical model into the tax gap discussion, consider the following
in light of lex parsimoniae: Is it more likely that (1) structural
systems such as legislation affect micro-level compliance
and, coincidentally, undulating compliance responding to these
“speed bumps” just happen to cancel each other out leaving
a statistically identical macro-level non-compliance rate for
the past ﬁfty years; or (2) a property characteristic of the
macro-level tax compliance system is simply letting voluntary
compliance play out according to that characteristic? If it is the
latter, a mathematical model is the best way to examine this
characteristic of the system. According to Fry, “Mathematics
is about abstracting away from reality, not replicating it. And
it offers real value in the process. By allowing yourself to view
the world from an abstract perspective, you create a language
that is uniquely able to capture and describe the patterns and
mechanisms that would otherwise remain hidden” [22].
It is also important to deﬁne terms. A model, as the
term is used here, refers to the relations which speculatively
describe a certain phenomenon, in this case the phenomenon
of tax non-compliance. Quantities that are measurable by
independent observation are variables. Here, the variables are
the non-compliance rates observed as estimates from the tax
gap studies. To formulate these relations, this approach also
introduces a parameter to the model that represents some
inherent property of the system [23].
The paper seeks ﬁrst and foremost to present a new ap-
proach to thinking about the macro-level tax gap other than
assuming that government authorities need to simply ﬁgure out
the next best steps to reduce it. It does not attempt to answer
the question, “What causes the tax gap?” It only provides a
mathematically-viable alternative explanation that potentially
has nothing to do with direct government intervention. In this
way, it aspires to begin a new dialogue on the tax gap instead
of simply adding additional conclusions to the literature based
on the existing assumption that government policies have a
direct effect on this macro-level measure. It attempts this by
analyzing tax compliance as a population.
The paper ﬁrst discusses the characteristics of a wicked
system, which prior work suggests might be an appropriate
domain of any voluntary tax compliance system [24]. It
then establishes a framework for analysis that considers a
population of monetary units that are legally due to the tax
authority for a speciﬁed period, which is the same basis of
tax gap analyses. This framework allows one to analyze tax
compliance as a population and graph the progression of tax
non-compliance given a parameter that is a property of a
speciﬁc jurisdiction’s tax system. Through this analysis, the
paper concludes that the parameter deﬁning the system is itself
deﬁned by a ﬁxed point around which the non-compliance
rates for various periods orbit.
The paper also offers some limitations of this approach;
speciﬁcally, veriﬁcation limits given the lack of adequate time
series data on tax non-compliance. It concludes that the tax
non-compliance observed at the macro level is a result of the
system feeding back on itself. Effects of tax authority actions
end up being negligible in analyzing the system qua system
even though these actions certainly affect individual taxpayers’
compliance decisions and those of disaggregated groups of
taxpayers. The paper also offers future research ideas based
on results from this new approach and some implications for
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tax policy.
II. ASSUMPTIONS AND FORMALIZATION
The formulation presented here contains as its essential idea
the concept of tax compliance measured as a population of
monetary units in what has been previously dubbed a “wicked
system.” It is, therefore, worthwhile to review the concept of
a wicked system and its essential characteristics.
A wicked system has both structural complicatedness and
self-organizing complexity. Legislatures and tax authorities
impose structural constraints on taxpayers in an effort to
increase voluntary compliance. At the same time, taxpayers
react to and operate within these constraints and interact with
individuals such as other taxpayers, tax advisors, etc. Hundreds
of millions of these interactions for any one tax period generate
some form of self-organization. Therefore, any model of a
wicked system must account for both aspects.
Previous work on tax compliance as a wicked system
suggests such a system is difﬁcult to model [24]. This is
because problems that tax policymakers and administrators
must deal with tend to defy efforts to delineate their boundaries
and identify their causes. These tendencies also hide the
problematic nature of attempts to legislate and regulate tax
compliance behavior [25]. One way to attempt an imperfect
model is to “chunk off” elements of the system, or analyze a
collection of “snapshots” much like an atlas is a collection of
snapshots that amounts to an imperfect model of a globe [26].
Prior work with ABMs suggest that increasing or decreasing
the local probability of non-compliance detection has little
to no global effect on the voluntary compliance rate. Yet,
a system-wide parameter does produce a positive non-linear
effect on compliance [5]. An attempt at even an imperfect
model, then, must assume the self-organizing complexity of
a large number of taxpayers represented by their actions
(measured in monetary units that are legally due to the tax
authority for a given period), and impose a global parameter
that is a characteristic of a speciﬁc jurisdiction’s tax system.
A. Establishing a Tax Compliance Function
It is simpler to work with the same units (money) and
states (compliance) as extant tax gap analyses. Consider the
population of n monetary units that are legally due to the tax
authority for the period t, which can be any taxable period.
Time is not considered continuous here since tax returns
and payments are typically ﬁled and paid in discrete taxable
periods. All references to a monetary unit henceforth should be
understood as a monetary unit legally due to the tax authority
for period t.
Notate the micro-state of monetary unit i with the covariate
pi, where pi ∈ {|V 〉 , |U〉}; that is, a monetary unit can exist
in either the micro-state |V 〉 or the micro-state |U〉. Here,
|V 〉 is the “voluntary compliance” micro-state of the system,
while |U〉 is the “non-compliance” micro-state. States |V 〉
and |U〉 are the only two possible micro-states. The complete
macro-state |N〉 of the population n for period t is, then, the
sum of the micro-states at t. Thus, any monetary unit in the
population and deﬁned only by the two micro-states is in the
set {p1, p2, . . . , pi, . . . , pn−1, pn}.
This is just one snapshot of the wicked system. As com-
plicated as it might ﬁrst appear, this formalization is still an
oversimpliﬁcation. Whenever pi = p j (that is, whenever two
monetary units look the same in terms of the observed covari-
ate only) they have the same probability of non-compliance.
This is not to say the monetary units i and j are the same
in all other respects. In fact, they might differ in many very
important ways and with regard to unmeasured covariates, e.g.,
qi = q j. Yet, for the purposes of this analysis these differences
do not affect the probability of non-compliance. This approach
is equivalent to the “chunking” discussed previously as a way
to analyze a wicked system.
Deﬁne xt as the non-compliance rate at period t. The system
has a non-compliance rate conﬁguration space S(x) = {x ∈
R : 0 ≥ x ≥ 1}. The system also has a set of possible non-
compliance rate conﬁgurations as functions of discrete (non-
continuous) time {x(t)∈R : 0≥ x(t)≥ 1, t ≥ 0, t ∈N} ⊆ S(x),
where x(t)≡ xt .
The goal is to ﬁnd a function f that represents x at the next
period t + 1 given some state of the population of monetary
units with respect to x at the current period t; that is, one
wants to ﬁnd a function f that maps xt → xt+1. Assume f is
a function of (1) the non-compliance rate x at t; and (2) some
other function g that maps to the scalar parameter λ , which
is a property characteristic of the system. In its curried form,
this becomes
g(xt → λ → f (xt ,λ )). (1)
Thus, f (xt ,λ ) is a function of xt and a parameter λ . Neither
are dynamically dependent on time.
B. Analyzing Tax Compliance as a Population
Considered as a population, the compliance state of mon-
etary units can grow or decay as with any other population
[27]- [29]. Beginning with ﬁrst principles one might ask, “Why
does voluntary compliance exist?” [30]. There are three rather
simple answers that are sufﬁcient for the purposes of this
paper. Voluntary compliance exists at t because:
1) pi ﬁrst appears in state |V 〉 at t;
2) pi transitions from |U〉 to |V 〉 at t;
3) pi does not transition from |V 〉 to |U〉 at t.
Additionally, there are both qualitative and quantitative
states of the total population of monetary units for a given
period. One can regard the qualitative state abstractly as
|N〉= |V 〉+ |U〉 . (2)
If one includes the number of monetary units in each state at
t this becomes
nt |N〉= vt |V 〉+ut |U〉 , (3)
where vt is the total number of monetary units in the voluntary
compliance micro-state and ut is the total number in the non-
compliance micro-state.
Since the raw number of monetary units in each state
changes for each period, one must normalize the quantities
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to examine the dynamics of the population at sequential
periods. One can do this by thinking of compliance and non-
compliance as rates instead of raw numbers associated with
abstract states. Dividing (3) through by nt yields
|N〉=
(
vt
nt
)
|V 〉+
(
ut
nt
)
|U〉 . (4)
Note that this gives the quantitative state of |N〉 in terms
of the non-compliance rate xt := (ut/nt) and the voluntary
compliance rate (1− xt) := (vt/nt). Equation (4) allows one
to consider x as a normalized population of monetary units in
the non-compliance micro-state for any period.
Because the transition of a qualitative state |U〉 at t to |V 〉
at t+1 depends on the quantitative state u |U〉 at t, xt+1 will
always depend at a minimum on xt . In other words, xt → xt+1,
which meets the condition from §II-A.
Table I data suggest that tax non-compliance seems to sta-
bilize around a certain measure. If thought of as a population,
one would expect compliance rates to stay the same from one
period to the next if and only if (1− x) = x. This is only
an expectation (average) since it is possible x might ﬂuctuate
wildly for each period even though there ends up being an
equilibrial balance over many periods that cancel the positive
and negative ﬂuctuations leaving only the expectation value.
TABLE I
NON-COMPLIANCE RATES BASED ON U. S. TAX GAP STUDIES
t x (w/o ±2% error)
1973 17.4%
1976 19.3%
1979 20.2%
1981 18.4%
1982 18.2%
1984 20.0%
1986 20.8%
1987 18.2%
1988 17.7%
1992 16.9%
2001 16.3%
2006 16.9%
2012 18.3%
Regarded as the function f (xt), one sees that an expected
change in the function with respect to xt is equilibrial if
〈∂ f (xt)/∂xt〉 = 0. Because the maximum change is unity
when xt = 0 and negative unity when xt = 1, this becomes
〈∂ f (xt)/∂xt〉 = (1− xt)− (xt) = 0. From this, one can state
more generally the expected change in the function even if
not in equilibrium as〈
∂ f (xt)
∂xt
〉
= (1− xt)− (xt) = 1−2xt . (5)
Yet, it is clear from the data in Table I that (1− xt) = xt .
Therefore, to achieve an expected stabilization point there must
also exist a constant parameter that represents a characteristic
of the system itself. Recall from (1) that the function mapping
xt to xt+1 is dependent on both xt and the parameter λ . Thus,
the expected change in the complete function is〈
d f (xt ,λ )
dxt
〉
= λ (1−2xt). (6)
Integrating (6) with respect to xt yields
f (xt ,λ ) = xt+1 = λ
∫
(1−2xt) dxt = λ (xt − x2t ). (7)
This function is the logistic map often employed to study
various populations. It maps the normalized non-compliance
population value at any time step to its value at the next step
[31]. Thus, the normalized non-compliance population level
xt+1 is a function of the previous time step’s population level xt
and the parameter λ . This iterative mapping provides a simple,
one-dimensional, discrete equation to use as a snapshot of the
tax compliance system.
If λ < 1, non-compliance will always decay to zero over
time. Higher values of λ might settle toward a ﬁxed point
ξ : xt+1 = xt , or ﬂuctuate across different values, just as any
other population might ﬂuctuate across a series of booms and
busts [32].
C. The System Parameter
The preceding implies that non-compliance is somehow
dependent on the parameter λ . But what is λ? Given that tax
compliance is an open system, one would expect the parameter
λ to produce some ﬁxed point ξ about which observations of
the phenomenon of tax non-compliance for different periods
not only ﬂuctuate but orbit. If tax compliance was a closed
system, ξ would serve as an attractor and eventually all
expected non-compliance rates would settle on this ﬁxed point
as long as it was stable. Yet, tax compliance is not a closed
system. It is an open system. For every period, the number of
taxpayers and the number of monetary units change. Moreover,
period t+1 might see individual taxpayers act differently with
regard to the covariate pi than they did at t. These variations
perturb the non-compliance rate so as to create an orbiting
dynamic about ξ .
In this way, the tax compliance system of a jurisdiction
is characterized by its ﬁxed point ξ . As long as the system
remains only perturbed and not fundamentally altered, then ξ
(and thereby λ ) should remain the same for all periods. On the
other hand, if the system is not merely perturbed but modulated
in such a way that it becomes fundamentally altered, then
ξ and λ would increase or decrease accordingly, thereby
changing the various non-compliance rates’ locus of orbit over
multiple periods. Accordingly, the parameter λ appears to be
some function of ξ .
D. Graphing Compliance Dynamics
What would this fundamental change in the system look
like if the parameter λ were to vary? One can examine this
as a non-continuous time series that generates the sequence
x0,x1,x2, · · · ,xτ (8)
where τ = t + k : τ ∈ N, τ  0, and k ∈ N. Note that this
sequence is both uniform and independent.
One can represent the dynamics of this process in two
dimensions on a state space where xt+1 is the ordinate and
xt is the abscissa. In other words, xt+1 is the next value in the
sequence following xt , xt+2 is the next value following xt+1,
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and so on. This reﬂects the sequence in (8) if t = 0. The graph
must include both xt+1 = f (xt ,λ ) (equation of iterated values)
and the identity function xt+1 = xt (ﬁxed points at speciﬁc
iterated values) where the range of x for all t is limited to the
interval [0,1] since x is a rate and not a quantity.
Start with some initial value of xt at t = 0 and plot the point
from (x0,0) to (x0,x1). Next, locate (x1,x1) since it is the new
starting point for period t+1 and move to (x1,x2). The point
representing the beginning of the next iteration will be (x2,x2),
etc. If one continues with this progression there will be one
of two possible results. Either the iteration will converge to a
ﬁxed point or it will diverge around one.
The system always has at least one ﬁxed point ξ . The
question is not whether ξ exists but whether it is stable or
unstable. Expected tax non-compliance rates converge when
this ﬁxed point is stable and diverge when it is unstable.
Equation (7) shows that xt+1 = λx−λx2, which means that
ξ can be deﬁned as
ξ = λξ −λξ 2. (9)
A little bit of algebraic manipulation yields
ξ (ξλ −λ +1) = 0. (10)
This produces two solutions:
ξ ∗ = 0 (11)
and
ξ = 1− 1
λ
. (12)
Equation (11) shows that there is always a ﬁxed point
at (xt ,xt+1) = (0,0), but this is trivial (hence, the asterisk).
What is more interesting is the solution in (12). Since the
parameter can only be non-negative and to avoid triviality,
one is interested in solutions for (12) where λ > 1.
This is the lower bound of the stable, non-trivial interval
for λ , but one can also solve for the upper bound. A stable ξ
must have a derivative on the interval (−1,1). In other words,
‖ f ′(x,λ )‖< 1. If ‖ f ′(x,λ )‖ ≥ 1 then ξ is unstable.
The stability dynamic is due to f ′(x,λ ) giving the rate of
change of f (x,λ ). If the magnitude of the rate of change is
less than unity then after multiple iterations the function will
get closer and closer to a ﬁxed point (it will be “pulled in” to
that point). Something is considered stable if it is perturbed
just a little and it tends to come back to that point rather than
tending to move away from it. If the magnitude of the rate of
change is greater than unity then after multiple iterations the
function will get farther and farther away from a ﬁxed point (it
will be “ﬂung out” from that point). Therefore, what is salient
for this paper’s purpose is the magnitude of the change, not
its sign. Whether it is positive or negative is just the direction
in which it is ﬂung. The direction is unimportant for purposes
of this analysis.
Equation (6) shows that f ′(x,λ ) = λ (1− 2x). For ξ ∗ in
(11), f ′(0,λ ) = λ . Thus, the trivial ﬁxed point is stable for
0≤ λ < 1. For the non-trivial solution ξ in (12), f ′ (1− 1λ ,λ)
is equal to
λ
[
1−2
(
1− 1
λ
)]
= 2−λ . (13)
This means ξ is stable for ‖2−λ‖< 1. Consequently, the
non-trivial solution produces stable ﬁxed points for parameters
on the interval (1,3). If λ is on this interval, 〈xτ〉 will converge
to a stable ﬁxed point at ξ in a closed system or will orbit
around ξ in an open system. Given (12), ξ can take any value
on the open interval
(
0, 23
)
. However, if λ ≥ 3 then ‖2−λ‖≥ 1
and 〈xτ〉 will neither converge to a stable ﬁxed point nor orbit
about it. Rather, it will diverge around ξ .
III. RESULTS
The published U.S. tax gap studies in Table I show observed
non-compliance rates, each with a ±2% margin of error. From
(12), one sees that
λ =
1
1−ξ . (14)
Consequently, (7) becomes
xt+1(1−ξ ) = xt(1− xt), (15)
which means that ξ = xt+1 = xt . Thus, given the error in the
results displayed in Table I, it is not inconsistent to assume
that the U.S. tax system is characterized by a parameter that
yields an idealized non-compliance rate of ξ . Again, since tax
compliance is an open system 〈x〉 is always slightly perturbed
at t+1 from its value at t. This would cause 〈x〉 to orbit about
ξ .
TABLE II
NON-COMPLIANCE RATES FROM ITERATED f (xt ,λ )
t f (x,λ ) Change
1973 17.4% 0.0%
1976 17.6% -1.7%
1979 19.0% -1.2%
1981 19.7% 1.3%
1982 18.4% 0.2%
1984 18.2% -1.8%
1986 19.6% -1.2%
1987 20.1% 1.9%
1988 18.2% 0.5%
1992 17.8% 0.9%
2001 17.2% 0.9%
2006 16.7% 0.2%
2012 17.2% -1.1%
Treating the tax compliance system as a population of
monetary units characterized by the parameter λ with f (x,λ )
iterated over each period yields identical results to those ob-
served in the tax compliance studies in Table I given the stated
error. Beginning with the 1973 report as x0 in the graphing
method described in §II-D, one gets the results displayed in
Table II with the difference from the non-compliance rate
reported in each study listed under the heading “Change.”
Notice that each difference from the respective x-value in
Table I is within that study’s assumed margin of error, thereby
making the results of iterated functions f (xt ,λ ) statistically
identical to the published non-compliance rate for each period.
This implies that the tax compliance system feeds back on
itself to regulate the system-level of compliance based on ξ . It
also means that one can deﬁne an empirically valid vector ﬁeld
in terms of x and t where the trajectory of x is proportional to
ξ +
[
cos
(
1+
τ
2
)
×{error}
]
.
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Additionally, in the phase space deﬁned by λ and ξ one
would expect a modiﬁed S-curve traced out by points of
negative divergence around ξ for 0 ≤ λ ≤ 3 and points of
positive divergence around ξ for λ > 3. One would also expect
a non-zero measure of curl since tax compliance is an open
system; although after λ = 4, parts of the region of the curl
around each point ξ would escape the boundary interval [0,1].
For this reason, and to avoid triviality, it makes sense to work
only with the (ξ ,λ ) coordinates between (0,1) and ( 34 ,4)
on this phase space, although ξ does asymptote to unity as
λ → ∞.
This interpretation of the tax gap data does not require an
assumption that tax authority action is an essential character-
istic of the system qua system (i.e., at the macro level), even
if government policies are shown to have signiﬁcant effects
on micro-level compliance trends within the same system.
Although this interpretation might at ﬁrst appear counterintu-
itive, it is important to remember that such differences occur
throughout observable experience in other disciplines. For
example, the number of quarks in a proton have a signiﬁcant
effect on quantum dynamics, but they are irrelevant to one
studying cellular composition in a biological system [33].
The same might be true for expected macro-level compliance
in a voluntary system. A tax authority’s control over the
discriminants of macro-level compliance becomes negligible
in a voluntary compliance system. This might be true even
with maximum third-party information matching.
IV. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
A. Dimensionality of the Tax Compliance Rate
This rudimentary snapshot has multiple limitations. For
example, what if x is actually a component of some unknown
vector, i.e., x ∈ x, or x = xk? In other words, available data
might not provide information on the variables of the under-
lying system, but rather on some function of those variables.
Further, the formal model as constructed here is univariate in
that it is only quadratic in x with a parameter λ , but what if
it is bivariate and quadratic in both x and λ? These would
constitute unknown (and perhaps unknowable) unknowns in
formalizing a voluntary compliance system, although the result
would be some kind of parabolic manifold.
If tax compliance is only one dimension of larger so-
cial, environmental, and even biological interactions, then tax
policymakers should manage their expectations about what
studying tax compliance can explain about other aspects of
society, the environment, and even life itself. In other words,
this mathematical relation might be powerful, but it might
also be incomplete because it is local only to the issue of
tax compliance and does not consider the global context of
all human interaction, including the complex interactions of
the tax authority and of other regulatory bodies in the overall
socio-political ecosystem. The system would not be reducible
to a single difference equation since each value of x would
be compatible with the multiple components of the abstract
vector x [34].
One can think of this system as a multi-dimensional snap-
shot. Formal tools for modeling this are currently beyond the
norm in the ﬁeld of tax law and administration. Therefore, the
next step in this research is to explore the unrestricted rational
mappings of both the x and the λ hyperplanes in Rk or even
C
k. This next step has already been explored abstractly by
Mandelbrot [35]. The focus of future research is to explore
how these abstract bounds translate to real social interactions,
especially with respect to legislation and regulations.
If the model presented here is just one of many snapshots
of the system, a proper arrangement of those snapshots might
require something akin to a metric tensor, which one can
denote as gαβ , instead of the one-dimensional scalar g(x) → λ .
A metric tensor is a function which takes as input a pair
of tangent vectors at a point on a Riemannian manifold and
produces a scalar. The metric tensor would allow an analysis of
an entire assortment of components that collectively make up
property characteristics of the tax compliance system. Such a
metric tensor in k-dimensional general curvilinear coordinates
could take the form of an a×b matrix of abstract vectors
gαβ =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
g11 g12 g13 · · · g1b
g21 g22 g23 · · · g2b
g31 g32 g33 · · · g3b
...
...
...
. . .
...
ga1 ga2 ga3 · · · gab
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
with the appropriate constraints, such as a= b= k. The indices
α and β take values 1,2,3, . . . ,k.
The metric tensor gives the square of the magnitude of
the inﬁnitesimal displacement in metric space of a curve on
a differentiable manifold with respect to the non-compliance
rate:
‖ds(x)‖2 =∑
αβ
(
gαβdx
αdxβ
)
. (16)
By parameterizing a curve such that x(t), the arc length of
the curve between xt and xt+1 becomes
‖s(x)‖=
∫ t+1
t
dt
√√√√∑
αβ
(
gαβ
dxα
dt
dxβ
dt
)
, (17)
which for purposes of this paper would be the magnitude of
the displacement in state space between states |N〉 at t and
t + 1. The only trade-off to using this method is that one
must assume temporal continuity. As previously discussed,
this is not an exact reﬂection of observable tax compliance
phenomena since taxpayers typically ﬁle returns and pay taxes
at discrete times.
A related area for future research would include whether this
state transition is subject to the principle of least action, which
appears to be fundamental in the state transitions of organized
systems and many other ﬁelds. If the state transitions along
the geodesic are subject to this principle then the transition
from state |N〉t to state |N〉t+1 would be the one with the least
action and, hence, the highest organization [36]. If this is the
case, the assumption of temporal continuity should not present
a problem since the “path” taken in state space between t and
t+1 would be constrained by the action principle.
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B. Lack of Adequate Data to Validate Theory
There is also a very practical limitation with this snapshot;
that is, the small sample of time series data currently available.
The formal theory presented in this paper relies heavily on
multiple iterations to discover both the stable and unstable
points ξ of a voluntary taxpayer compliance system. Yet, it
remains difﬁcult, if not impossible at present, to validate this
theory without signiﬁcantly robust time series data. Not only is
such time series data necessarily ﬁnite, it is extremely limited
and incredibly difﬁcult to granulize since it is only reported in
the aggregate by way of annual statistical publications from a
tax authority, such as the IRS’s annual Data Book.
Publicly-available tax enforcement data from which one can
derive a certain expected measure of compliance are reported,
at best, on an annual basis. Such a limitation can create a
kind of false positive in that a linear random system, which
this paper argues against, can generate effects that mimic a
non-linear deterministic yet dynamic system, which this paper
argues for, if the time series data is relatively small [37].
Currently, the limited time series data makes it difﬁcult
to discern whether the time series is generated by a linear
stochastic system or a non-linear wicked system. Further, it is
also possible to have a mixed variant where a wicked system
contains some random stochastic components [38]. These will
remain difﬁcult hurdles to overcome as long as the available
time series data remain small and aggregated.
V. TAX POLICY IMPLICATIONS
If the results in §III are correct, the effects on tax policy are
considerable. It has been famously said that “tax administra-
tion is tax policy” [39]. What the tax authority can administer
effectively becomes a jurisdiction’s policy on what and how
much to tax. But how a jurisdiction increases revenue is just
as important as the increase itself. Good tax administration
is almost never simply about getting more revenue [40]. As
Christians notes, issues of equity and justice are inescapable
[41]. Consequently, the three traditional criteria of tax policy
analysis are equity, efﬁciency, and administrability. This sec-
tion touches on just three tax policy issues: tax expenditures,
third-party information matching, and the voluntary compli-
ance system itself.
A. Tax Expenditures
The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of
1974 deﬁnes tax expenditures as “revenue losses attributable
to provisions of the Federal tax laws which allow a special
exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross income or
which provide a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a
deferral of tax liability” [43]. The Joint Committee on Taxation
provides ofﬁcial revenue estimates for all tax legislation con-
sidered by Congress. The Treasury Department also provides
estimates, although the two do not always coincide. United
States government ofﬁcials have long hinted at, if not ofﬁcially
recommended, that the elimination of tax expenditures would
signiﬁcantly decrease the tax gap [44]. The usual reason
given is that tax expenditures create complexity, which creates
increased opportunities for both taxpayer mistake and evasion
[44]. Eliminating certain tax expenditures, so the argument
goes, would eliminate these opportunities and thereby decrease
the tax gap.
Others go further. In her 2012 Annual Report to Congress,
the IRS’s National Taxpayer Advocate opined in support of tax
expenditure elimination that “if Congress were to eliminate all
tax expenditures, straight math indicates it could cut individual
income tax rates by 44 percent and still generate the same
amount of revenue it collects under current rules” [45].
This is a potentially dangerous leap. Although tax expendi-
tures are deﬁned as revenue reductions, they do not represent
a one-to-one mapping to potential tax revenue increases. The
Treasury Department’s Ofﬁce of Tax Policy (OTP) recog-
nizes this and regularly warns Congress about the fallacious
assumption. Repealed tax expenditures do not necessarily
equal an increase in tax revenues because (1) eliminating a
tax expenditure might alter taxpayer behavior, which in turn
might affect the resulting voluntary compliance measured in
monetary units; and (2) repeal of a tax expenditure might
increase or decrease tax revenues independent of changes in
taxpayer behaviors. For example:
[R]epeal of an itemized deduction could increase the
revenue costs from other deductions because some
taxpayers would be moved into higher tax brackets.
Alternatively, repeal of an itemized deduction could
lower the revenue cost from other deductions if
taxpayers are led to claim the standard deduction
instead of itemizing.
[46]
Additionally, provisions in the tax code are not completely
modular. They are not like fuses on a circuit board that can
be added or removed independent of other fuses. According
to OTP, “If two provisions were repealed simultaneously, the
increase in tax liability could be greater or less than the sum of
the two separate tax expenditures, because each is estimated
assuming that the other remains in force” [46].
If the alternative formalization of the tax gap explained
in this paper is correct, then the effect of tax expenditures
on the tax gap might be negligible as with enforcement
magnitudes. There is some evidence supporting this conjec-
ture. First, Congress radically modiﬁed the number and type
of tax expenditures since the 1974 Act, especially leading
up to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 [47]. The most recent
report from OTP enumerates 167 items, compared to the 1974
report that enumerated 67 items [44]. Yet, the normalized tax
gap has remained statistically unchanged. Since Congress has
signiﬁcantly changed tax expenditures over the past 50 years
creating undulations in the monetary value of tax expenditures
compared to gross tax revenues and the Gross Domestic
Product, and these changes do not map one-to-one to tax
revenue increases, it would be an improbable coincidence
that the normalized tax gap would remain unchanged by the
“expert” congressional planning of adding, removing, and
modifying tax expenditures in just the right way so as to
leave the normalized tax gap unchanged. A more probable
explanation is the one given here relating to the U.S. voluntary
compliance system itself.
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Second, there is evidence in the tax gap data that even
if there is a signiﬁcant change in taxpayer behavior relating
to tax expenditures such as credits, the macro-level tax gap
remains unaffected. Comparing tax gap reports for 2001, 2006,
and 2012, one ﬁnds signiﬁcant undulations (greater than the
2 percent error) in certain disaggregated groups of taxpayers
(micro-level), but no signiﬁcant change in the macro-level tax
gap.
For example, between 2001 and 2006, the change in the
Individual Business Income Tax underreporting gap was −4.5
percent. This decrease was offset by a change in Corporation
Income Tax underreporting gap of 6.2 percent, for a net change
of 1.7 percent. This period also witnessed an insigniﬁcant net
change of −1.3 percent in Individual Income Tax underre-
porting due to Credits. Yet, the macro-level tax gap only saw
a net change of −0.6 percent. Between 2006 and 2012, the
change in Individual Business Income Tax underreporting gap
was not signiﬁcant at only 0.2 percent, although the change in
Corporation Income Tax underreporting gap remained signiﬁ-
cant at −5.9 percent. This period also witnessed a signiﬁcant
change of −2.5 percent in underreporting due to Credits. Still,
the macro-level tax gap experienced a non-signiﬁcant change
of −1.4 percent, half of which ofﬁcials attribute to updated
estimation methods and not an actual decrease in voluntary
compliance [48].
Thus, the number of public resources marshaled to collect
and analyze tax expenditure data, compile these analyses
into congressional reports, and then translate the reports into
legislative action might very well represent poor stewardship.
If the normalized tax gap is unaffected by signiﬁcant changes
in tax expenditures, perhaps those resources are better focused
elsewhere. Certain mainstay tax expenditures, such as the
individual deduction for state and local taxes, are now at
least temporarily reduced by the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act
[49]. It will be interesting to see if the next tax gap study is
signiﬁcantly changed given these tax expenditure exclusions.
If not, it will serve as further evidence that changes in tax
expenditures have little to no effect of the macro-level tax
gap.
Auerbach justiﬁes tax expenditures differently. Instead of
claiming that they increase voluntary compliance, he claims
that tax expenditures reduce individual taxpayer burden [50].
For example, the exclusion of capital gains on owner-occupied
housing eliminates the need for homeowners to maintain de-
tailed records of all home improvements necessary to establish
the basis for the home at the time of sale [51], [52]. While
reduction of taxpayer burden might remain a valid policy
end that justiﬁes spending signiﬁcant resources examining tax
expenditures, a policy argument in favor of such analysis for
purposes of reducing the tax gap will have very dull teeth
if the alternative formalization in this paper is correct [53].
Therefore, this approach fundamentally changes the tax policy
discussion regarding expenditures to the extent expenditures
are believed to affect the macro-level tax gap.
B. Third-Party Information Matching
As discussed in §I, there is notable extant scholarship on
the topic of reducing the tax gap by increasing third-party
information reporting to the IRS so the tax authority can match
this information against self-reports. The hypothesis is that
such reporting and matching increases a taxpayer’s perceived
probability of getting caught underreporting. This focus shifts
the emphasis from detection probability by audit to detection
probability by third-party information that a tax authority
then uses to verify the original taxpayer reports. Third-party
information has become central to U.S. tax collection since
1974 and exponential improvements in information technology
have made reporting and matching a preferred method for tax
compliance and enforcement [54].
There are data that support this hypothesis at the micro-
level. Lederman shows that taxpayer groups typically subject
to third-party information matching tend to have signiﬁcantly
higher rates of voluntary compliance than those not subject
to the same centralized standard [14], [15], [18]. Viswanathan
warns that congressional failure to regulate information report-
ing for blockchain, the “gig” economy, and any other income
derived from “sources that are difﬁcult to regulate” will lead
to a sharp increase in the tax gap [55].
But is this necessarily so? This paper already addressed
the fact that the macro-level tax gap shows no change for
periods prior to third-party information matching and after its
initiation in 1974 and its later development. While there is
evidence to support the hypothesis at micro-levels, there is
no evidence that changes in third-party information matching
have any effect on the macro-level tax gap. Again, this is
supported by previous work with ABMs showing that higher
probabilities of detection increase compliance at the micro-
level, but have no noticeable effect at the macro-level [5].
For tax policy purposes, this suggests that regardless of an
increase in blockchain, ride sharing, or other radical changes
in the informal economy, and regardless of congressional
action or inaction regulating third-party information from
those income sources there is little chance of any statisti-
cally signiﬁcant change in the macro-level tax gap. The data
conﬁrm that certain administrative and statutory enforcement
structures such as information matching do increase voluntary
compliance [56], but only when such is measured at the
micro-level; what Andersson and To¨rnberg call “sub-wicked
systems” [57]. Thus, the conclusion that more deterrence leads
to greater compliance is not incorrect; it is just incomplete
when referring to the macro-level (“wicked system”) tax gap.
At ﬁrst, this appears paradoxical. Upon further reﬂection,
however, perhaps the paradox is only in a Quinean sense [58].
An intuitive result at the micro-level but not at the macro-level
creates a sense of surprise if not complete dissonance. Yet, this
sense dissipates once one resolves the connections yielding
strange-but-true results. One is left with the conclusion that,
possibly, different forms of measurement (micro vs. macro)
imply that different things are being measured. Since the
causal explanation of information matching does not comport
with observed data, one must look for answers elsewhere.
C. The Voluntary Compliance System
If Congress continues to demand a policy goal of reducing
the tax gap, then given the results in this paper it might
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not be enough to create additional structures that require
more third-party information reporting. Instead, the essential
characteristics of a voluntary tax compliance system itself
might have to change. One such change might be that the
government must control distribution of the actual income and
not just information about the income distribution. Of course,
such a system would by deﬁnition no longer be a voluntary
compliance system. As a result, terms like “voluntary compli-
ance rate” and “tax gap” would have no meaning in this revised
system. The system itself would be fundamentally modulated,
not merely perturbed.
This observation might ﬁrst appear over the top, but it is
indicative of the kinds of discussions tax policymakers and
administrators must have if a tax authority’s inﬂuence on re-
ducing the tax gap is as it appears: negligible. Such discussions
are necessary because tax policy unintended consequences are
an illusion. There are only consequences [59]. Any change
in tax policy must consider the desired effects (e.g., greater
revenue, less administrative costs, etc.) and also the relevant
consequences that such a change might produce, including
increased taxpayer discontent and an inadministrable system
[60]. To paraphrase Rittel and Webber, the aim of tax policy
is not to ﬁnd the truth, but to improve the mechanisms of tax
administration to meet a desired end in the real world.
It is quite possible that current government actions relating
to the tax gap amount to nothing more than theater. It does not
matter that this consequence is unintentional. It does not matter
that this consequence is not malicious. It does not matter
that it is due to a belief that attempting to do something is
better than doing nothing even if doing something yields no
better results and creates collateral effects. The end might still
amount to nothing more than theater, and if so it is important
for policymakers to recognize this.
Why? Because tax policy is not like philosophy, mathe-
matics, or the theoretical sciences where the contributions of
practitioners are just as important even if others later prove
them wrong. When it comes to tax policy and administration,
such immunity cannot be tolerated. Policymakers are respon-
sible for the public actions they inspire and any resulting
consequences. Rarely are these actions meaningless as they
usually matter a great deal to those who are touched directly by
them. Therefore, tax policymakers have “no right to be wrong”
[42]. In this way, the three criteria of tax policy analysis —
equity, efﬁciency, and administrability — ﬁnd new faces in a
wicked tax system.
Signiﬁcantly reducing the tax gap (i.e., raising more rev-
enue) while still maintaining the low administrative costs
of a voluntary compliance system might not be an option.
More revenue might require an unacceptably high investment
in a fully-centralized “income control system” that ends up
being both impractical and, to many, an affront to democratic
ideals. It is very possible that if tax policy favors a voluntary
compliance system, then the current voluntary compliance rate
is the best that it gets. For this reason, difﬁcult conversations
and new ideas are here needed.
VI. CONCLUSION
Policymakers, practitioners, and researchers have tried for
at least half a century to develop a better understanding of the
channels through which laws, regulations, and tax authority
actions can improve voluntary taxpayer compliance. Yet, there
is clearly still much to learn. The one unchanging assumption
in this ongoing endeavor has been that tax authority interven-
tion of some kind can control, and thereby improve, voluntary
compliance. It has been assumed that the goal, therefore, is
to ﬁnd the most efﬁcient government intervention to raise
revenue by reducing the tax gap without questioning if such
intervention actually affects voluntary compliance.
This paper has attempted an alternative explanation for
observed measures of voluntary tax compliance in the United
States assuming this wicked system. It has done so by present-
ing a second formulation of non-compliance rates that achieves
results mathematically equivalent to those observed in the tax
gap studies. Instead of looking for causal explanations in the
context of local taxpayer compliance and attempting to scale
them to explain macro-level data, it examined the tax system
qua system by starting with the population of monetary units
legally due to the tax authority for a speciﬁc period. From
this population, it derived a function that describes the non-
compliance rate at the next period based on the same rate at
the previous period and a system-level parameter. The paper
explained that this parameter itself is a function of an expecta-
tion value of non-compliance for the system. Predictions based
on this explanation were shown to be statistically identical to
the tax gap estimates published in studies over the past ﬁfty
years.
The formal model here illumines only slightly the theoreti-
cal effects of tax authority actions on the tax gap. If the effect
is negligible, tax policymakers and administrators might have
to face the tough decision between an increase in tax revenue
and maintaining a voluntary compliance system.
This paper shows that, over time, normalized non-
compliance can orbit a stable expected value in a voluntary
system. There remain a multitude of other “snapshots” that
might provide a better understanding of the system as a whole.
The one explored here hopefully starts a conversation on
alternate ways of looking at voluntary tax compliance; even if
through a lens, darkly. Such conversations are critical, for if
the tax gap ratio in the United States is not only inveterate but
incorrigible, creative alternatives to achieving tax policy ends
must be explored.
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